Advocacy and climate research

The latest furore to erupt in the climate blogosphere concerns whether climate scientists undermine their credibility by engaging in advocacy? (For some responses, see James Annan, Gretchen Goldman and HB&H.)

As it happens, I recently wrote a term-paper on this exact issue for my philosophy of science class. I've decided to make it available here for those who are interested in this debate!

To summarise, I don't see anything inherently wrong with scientists engaging in political advocacy, as long as they are explicit in their intentions... and the scope of their expertise. (E.g. I often see physical scientists make strong pronouncements about economic matters and that makes me uncomfortable.) One climate scientist whom I feel always struck a good balance on these issues and quote in my term-paper is the late Stephen Schneider. To channel Schneider: Our response to climate change must be underpinned by scientific facts, but it should ultimately also be reflective of society's value judgements -- including those of our scientists.

Some brief points/caveats:

• This was a “pass/fail” essay, aimed at gaining admission to sit the exam, and I hope that you’ll evaluate the material accordingly. That said, the emphasis on citations and quotations probably means that it provides a good overview of the issues.
• Apart from scientists working on the physical basis for climate change, I also tried to pay special attention to the role of economists. The Stern Review, which many people regard as the archetypal blend of economics and advocacy, therefore comes in for special attention.

Click to read the term-paper.

UPDATE: I've just finished listening to a very interesting discussion between the climate scientists, Gavin Schmidt, Richard Betts and Judith Curry, on this precise topic. I am again struck by something that was very clear to me whilst researching my essay: The various sides all seem to agree on the principles (i.e. being open about one’s area of expertise and clear on your value judgements when advocating for policy). The real sticking point appears to be one of application.

Climate science is pseudoscience(?)

So says Ivo Vegter in his latest column, calling up the spirit of Karl Popper.

I drop by in several places in the comments, saying that this pretty much utter nonsense according to any reasonable definition of the falsifiability criteria. For example:

[...]As it happens, Ivo has also beautifully misconstrued the application of Popper's insights, by consistently conflating the actual science with the response to that science by various parties.

[...]At its heart, falsification is about using an underlying set of theories to make predictions that can be tested against the relevant evidence. The theory of (man-made) climate change satisfies the falsifiability criteria across multiple dimensions. The fundamental pretexts of climate science are rooted in physics that has been understood and tested since the early contributions of Fourier, Tyndall and Arrenhuis in the nineteenth century. For their part, modern day climate models absolutely meet the Popperian standards. Not only do they forecast how climate phenomena will evolve under conditions of continued emissions, but (crucially) they have been extremely successful in hindcasting previous changes to the climate. Indeed, this accurate replication of past events is how they are selected in the first place…

As part of his reply to this comment, Ivo made the strange assertion that the ability to hindcast models is weakened by the fact that these models can be "tweaked" to accurately match the observed data. I respond:

How is it a case against climate scientists that they were able to benchmark their theories against against a historic record with "perfect hindsight"? Speaking as someone with a fairly considerable amount of scientific training, that actually sounds pretty ideal. Models were back-tested, refined and then discarded in favour of ones that better fit the data... pretty much in exact accordance with the scientific method.

For the record, I am well aware that Popper's falsification doctrine is not without its problems. Still, and at the very least, if someone is going to invoke his authority to make specific claims, then they should at least make sure they are accurate within that framework.

UPDATE: Oh God, it gets worse. Someone responds to me with the immortal line: "I have not done the research but from my own basic calculations..." *headvice*

UPDATE 2: See this excellent 2005 post by NASA's Gavin Schmidt: Is Climate Modelling Science? It concludes: "So, in summary, the model results are compared to data, and if there is a mismatch, both the data and the models are re-examined. Sometimes the models can be improved, sometimes the data was mis-interpreted. Every time this happens and we get improved matches between them, we have a little more confidence in their projections for the future, and we go out and look for better tests. That is in fact pretty close to the textbook definition of science."

The limits of reductio ad absurdum

Unlearning Econ has a new post up on Milton Friedman in which he, among other things, criticises Friedman's use of reductio ad absurdum arguments to win debates. I have a number of reservations about the use of reductio ad absurdum in the social sciences myself, and this seems as good a time as any to write them up. (I'll refrain here from commenting on UE's direct criticisms of Friedman.)

Reductio ad absurdum (RAA) is a reasoning technique where a set of hypotheses are shown to result in absurd or untenable situations if taken to their full logical conclusion(s). An invaluable tool in much of mathematics and pure logic -- where it is really a form of proof by contradiction -- I'm less convinced of RAA's usefulness in human affairs.

Interestingly, RAA appears particularly popular with groups on the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum. To the best of my knowledge, for instance, anarcho-capitalists base much of their belief system on some form of RAA reasoning or another (abetted perhaps with an appeal to natural rights -- a rather dubious concept to my mind). However, absolutist or deontological reasoning can take you to some pretty uncomfortable places very quickly. Even perfectly sound concepts are not immune to being overwhelmed by RAA-type arguments.

Consider that fundamental pillar of any market-based economy: property rights. It's hard to imagine that any prosperous and vibrant society could be sustained for long in the absence of property rights. However, a property rights regime doesn't fare particularly well under the scrutiny of RAA reasoning. For one thing, it implies that we should hold the wishes of the property owner as sacrosanct. I can then easily hypothesize a situation where the productive activities of the world are dramatically constrained by a small group of individuals who refuse to compromise on any violations of their own property. For example, here's an older post that considers the case of climate change and a group of radical environmentalists whose love for nature is not for sale. I think that my conclusion remains valid: "Libertarians that slavishly hold personal property rights above all else would inadvertently open the way for eco-fundamentalists to enjoin virtually all industrial activity. In doing so, they would threaten to form an unholy coalition that makes it impossible for society to react to an immensely complex problem [i.e. climate change] in any sensible way. They would, in effect, become Baptists and Bootleggers for the 21st century."

Another example of dubious RAA reasoning that I encountered recently was on the subject of gay marriage. One of the conservative discussants in our group cautioned that if men (or women) were allowed to marry other men (women), then what grounds did we have to stop someone from marrying a tree or their dog? Leaving aside the problems of mutual consent -- how does Fido feel about this? -- the problem here is that this remorseless logic applies equally to marriage between a man and woman! If John and Judy are allowed tie the knot, then why can't Ken take his vows with that splendid bougainvillea over there? The point here is that sometimes you can't salvage an argument by logical reasoning alone, especially where social institutions and ethics are concerned. The boundaries that we place on things may be arbitrary in the scheme of things, but that doesn't make them senseless. I am also comforted by the fact that social norms evolve over time, even if the pace on certain subjects like gay marriage is unacceptably slow.

THOUGHT FOR THE DAY: Be cautious of arguments that are "won" by reductio ad absurdum. Very few things in our social and moral landscape are black and white, so that even the soundest concepts may not survive the absurdity of being taken to their full conclusions.

Hippie Baptists and Libertarian Bootleggers

Like, take it easy, Man.

Disclaimer: I've conflated a lot of libertarianism/Austrianism in post. This was partly for simplicity, but also because I'm recalling a personal exchange where the people involved were familiar with each other's ideological beliefs. My advice before continuing; if the shoe fits, wear it. If not, don't. 

Fresh on the heels of my discussion on the roll of tort law in controlling pollution, say nothing of the asteroid vs taxes showdown, here is another take on the moral implications of dogmatic libertarianism in the presence of negative externalities. In particular, David Sobel argues that strict/deontological libertarianism takes us to untenable places if applied to climate change (and other pollution problems affecting "the commons"):

Libertarianism and Pollution

One might try saying that we are better off because people polluted, or flew, or whatever. If previous generations had been forbidden from doing this, we would have much less material wealth. But again, I might be better off if someone straps me down and involuntarily gives me a root canal, but still, I would have thought, that does not show that doing so does not violate my Libertarian rights. The polluter seems to not leave as much and as good air, water, whatever, for the rest of us, thus seemingly violating the Lockian Proviso. One might try to compensate for the loss but I don’t see how to put a price on the loss. One might give the loss a market price but I might truthfully not have been willing to make the trade at that price. One could try asking me what price I want, but that will result in strategic issues and some rabid anti-pollution folks who will not sell at any price.

Sobel continues in a follow-up post (Property Rights and Moral Seriousness), in which he basically says that failure to distinguish various degrees of rights violations forces libertarians into ridiculous positions:

Now if [all] rights violation were treated as just as morally important as taking someone’s organs against her will, then, since there will be many such rights violations as a result of the pollution, surely such pollution would be impermissible. But this would shut down much of the economy of the world we are imagining and it would radically restrict the liberties of people in such a world. 

[HT: Bleeding Heart Libertarians]

===

Without being too self-congratulatory, I've been trying to point out the same issues to dogmatic libertarian friends of mine for some time. Here is part of an email that I wrote to one such friend last year:

I actually think that the Austrian/Libertarian perspective is particularly weak in this area [i.e. dealing with climate change], given its slavish fixation on property rights. Consider the hypothetical case of some hippie refusing to bargain for any climate change impacts on his property... Let’s just imagine that his love for the environment is not for sale. As far as I understand, he would have the right to enjoin all activities threatening his property under a strict Libertarian framework. Is that correct? If so, couldn’t we literally see a complete shutdown of industry based on the preferences of a very small portion of the population?

My friend responded by saying that other people would hold vastly different subjective valuations of the hippie's property (e.g. $5 versus $5 trillion). Following this, he made the assertion that: "Whatever our subjective valuations are, there will be a market price for this against which the hippie's claim would be measured, to see whether it is reasonable or not." He went on to add that the courts would eventually decide who's claim is most reasonable. I replied:

You haven't answered the question... And it appears that you are abandoning your principles and embracing mine; which would make sense to me, as I can't see the Austrian property fixation holding up to broader logic and a sense of social justice or, (warning: bad word ahead) fairness.  

This is how I understand the "Austrian" position:  

If it is my property, then -- excluding murder and so forth -- I am the only person entitled to decide what happens there. Non-coercion and all that, right? Since we've just been discussing subjective value, isn't it also irrelevant what price you or any other person (including the court) would accept or deem fair for climate change impacts to the hippie's property? He owns this land and $5 trillion is his valuation. To be strictly consistent with your original theory, the court would have to accept that the hippie's subjective value as the only one that ultimately counts... whether everyone else regards it as ridiculous or not. 

A simple thought experiment: Let's imagine it as an extreme version of 'The Castle' [brilliant movie if you haven't seen it - Ed]. Except now substitute the Kerrigins with the hippie, and the Melbourne Airport Company with CO2-emitting industries around the world. The Kerrigins didn't want to move and, ultimately, the courts forbade the Airport company from expanding despite all their financial sweeteners as recompense. In this case, the hippie also doesn't care for generous financial compensation and won't move either. Industry has to stop activities or else find a way to emitting the carbon that impacts the hippie's property. Again: he would ostensibly have the right to enjoin ALL activities impacting his property. 

Of course, I don't regard this is a reasonable position to support. That's why I don't subscribe to it. I think that, somewhere along the line, we have to try and incorporate broader social welfare calculations that transcend the unyielding veto of private property rights. However, as far as I can tell, my little scenario above encapsulates your position pretty well if taken to it's logical conclusion. Either you stick to your guns by accepting that the owner's subjective valuation of his own property right is sacrosanct, and that he has the final say on what happens on his land... Or, you override his subjective valuation through court decision, but betray your fundamental principles in the process. 

THOUGHT FOR THE DAY: Making compromises is part of life. Taking the dogmatic/ deontological libertarian position to its ultimate conclusion often leads - I believe - to untenable outcomes. The case of global warming is a prime example. Libertarians that slavishly hold personal property rights above all else would inadvertently open the way for eco-fundamentalists to enjoin virtually all industrial activity. In doing so, they would threaten to form an unholy coalition that makes it impossible for society to react to an immensely complex problem in any sensible way. They would, in effect, become Baptists and Bootleggers for the 21st century.

Sisters: Doing it for themselves

Action Axiom: Rothbard contra Mises/Kant

Okay, last thing I'm going to post on the action axiom for a while, but a friend (of unabashed anarcho-capitalist persuasions) emails me:

You may find it interesting that [Murray] Rothbard actually disagreed with Mises on the falsifiability and empiricism of the action axiom. I'm surprised to see no-one has mentioned this in the thread...

Turning from the deduction process to the axioms themselves, what is their epistemological status? Here the problems are obscured by a difference of opinion within the praxeological camp, particularly on the nature of the fundamental axiom of action. Ludwig von Mises, as an adherent of Kantian epistemology, asserted that the concept of action is a priori to all experience, because it is, like the law of cause and effect, part of "the essential and necessary character of the logical structure of the human mind." Without delving too deeply into the murky waters of epistemology, I would deny, as an Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any such alleged "laws of logical structure" that the human mind necessarily imposes on the chaotic structure of reality. Instead, I would call all such laws "laws of reality," which the mind apprehends from investigating and collating the facts of the real world. My view is that the fundamental axiom and subsidiary axioms are derived from the experience of reality and are therefore in the broadest sense empirical. I would agree with the Aristotelian realist view that its doctrine is radically empirical, far more so than the post-Humean empiricism which is dominant in modern philosophy.  

[snip]

If, in the broad sense, the axioms of praxeology are radically empirical, they are far from the post-Humean empiricism that pervades the modern methodology of social science. In addition to the foregoing considerations, (1) they are so broadly based in common human experience that once enunciated they become self-evident and hence do not meet the fashionable criterion of "falsifiability"; (2) they rest, particularly the action axiom, on universal inner experience, as well as on external experience, that is, the evidence is reflective rather than purely physical; and (3) they are therefore a priori to the complex historical events to which modern empiricism confines the concept of  "experience."

You can find the whole article here if you want to read it.

While I certainly don't profess to share my friend's strong anarcho-capitalist leanings[*], I found this an intriguing passage and certainly appreciate the heads-up. Indeed, I was not aware that Rothbard had rejected Mises's invocation of Kant in isolating the action axiom. Of course, there seems to be no significant disagreement on the issue of falsifiability even though they use different epistemological perspectives... Back to square one? Anyway,  I'm heading out now so will just leave this here as food for thought for anyone interested in the discussion.

Have a good weekend, everybody!

[*] I believe that he has read Man, Economy and State cover-to-cover, which is more Rothbard than I'm likely to get through in my entire lifetime.

Links - Anti-polemic edition

It's something of a point of pride that I don't wish this blog to descend into a polemic. In that spirit, here are several links to some interesting articles regardless of whether I support the views of the author (or subject) or not.

Note the seamless transitions...
<winks eyebrows>

1) Letters to a heretic: An email conversation with climate change sceptic Freeman Dyson. The science editor of The Independent, Steve O'Connor, sets out to establish why eminent physicist Freeman Dyson remains one of the (apparently) few high-profile scientists not to endorse the mainstream theory on anthropogenic global warming. For me, this is ultimately a very disappointing conversation which degenerates into an abrupt (non) conclusion. As usual, both sides are claiming victory against the other as a result. My own feeling is that nothing was gained and I left two comments to this effect, including a link to a superior article on Dyson, as well as some information for those whining about use of the word "heretic". [Note: While I do regard Dyson as ultimately being at fault for pulling the plug on interview, I think that O'Connor's line of questioning became increasingly poor as the interview went on. With Dyson getting tetchy, why not engage him on the specific issues surrounding the use of computer models? How are people improving them and what makes him confident that they are overstating the role of carbon when the models have proved to be accurate - or, if anything, overoptimistic - until this point?]

Seeing as we're on the subject of the carbon cycle...

2) The Economist reports on the "Deep Carbon" project, an attempt to expand the knowledge of the carbon cycle. I noted with interest that article makes reference to the abiogenic theory of petroleum, which I first heard about (briefly) in a class that I took on petroleum economics. Basically, the abiogenic theory holds that - rather than being the remains of organic material - oil originates from the earth's core where extreme pressures and heat convert carbonates into hydrocarbons. If true, this would mean that there is practically no limit on how much oil could ultimately be extracted for human purposes. Widely disregarded elsewhere, this theory still holds credence among a number of scientists from the former USSR countries, where it gained particular attention during the Cold War. Of course, most Western geologists and scientists regard this hypothesis as akin to the phlogiston theory of fire and thoroughly discredited. For their part, the proponents of the abiogenic theory continue to offer alternative evidence as "proof" that no such debunking has taken place. It all makes for enteraining reading, but you certainly wouldn't catch me putting any money on it. {Side note: I can't help but notice the eerie parallels between the abiogenic theory and those put forward by the increasingly delusional characters in Umberto Eco's occultist spoof Foucalt's Pendulum, e.g. serpentine mechanisms vs telluric currents.[*]}

Speaking of oil...

3) "The age of cheap oil is over" according to the International Energy Agency. (Hmmm, what's that Radiohead song again...?) I've been holding back on posting anything regarding the recent spike in oil prices that has followed the turmoil in North Africa, mostly because it has been exhaustively covered and is entirely expected. However, these temporary factors notwithstanding, I think it's pretty safe to assume that we have already entered a higher oil price plateau. Primary reasons: i) Rapidly increasing demand from emerging economies such as China and India, and ii) Increased cost of extraction from new sources (tar sands, deep offshore drilling). Then, there's always the possibility that the world might sometime revoke the obscene level of subsidisation that characterises the global fossil fuels industry ($350bn-$550bn). Of course, its not all bad news as high prices are the invaluable investment signal for further petroleum exploration and/or bringing alternative energy sources on-stream. Every cloud...

Okay, there's no seemless transition next as we're back to dealing with climate change and, more specifically, the factors that underlie peoples' almost visceral reaction to the subject. Although, in that way, I suppose it certainly concerns polemics...

4) Noam Chomsky has thoughts on how climate change became a 'liberal hoax'. As always, the mention of Chomsky's name calls forth much unfounded vitriol in some corners. I left a comment on another wesbite after seeing some of the usual suspects ranting about this "Pol Pot lovin', murderin' Marxist"... which , of course, is complete BS. I tried to point out how Chomsky was factually critiquing the biased U.S. media coverage of foreign policy and the very important context in which he made these remarks. You don't need to support all, or even most of Chomsky's views, but you at least owe it yourself to understand what he was critiquing. A section of my comment: [T]his bizzare manufactured controversy regarding [Chomsky's] comments on Cambodia show up his critics for what they really: Rabid idealogues who are unable to engage him in honest debate. It says volumes about your character (say nothing of the paucity of your arguments) if you can only resort to deliberate distortions of your opponent's argument and perpetuate outright lies in order to achieve any kind of advantage. Unfortunately, I see more and more situations every day where the above sentiments could be applied.

Finally (again, no relation to the previous point!)...

5) Mattheus and Jonathan at Economic Thought offer their thoughts on my concerns regarding Mises's action axiom and it's qualification as a Kantian synthetic a priori fact.


[*] Speaking of serpentine forces and conspiracy theorists, compare this amusing quote from the book: "The animal that coils in a circle is the serpent; that's why so many cults and myths of the serpent exist, because it's hard to represent the return of the sun by the coiling of a hippopotamus."

George Selgin on the Action Axiom

Plus my reply.

I was pleasantly surprised to see George Selgin leave a comment underneath my previous post concerning Mises's action axiom. In case you missed it, I had quoted a paragraph from an old journal essay of his before voicing my concerns over the extent to which Mises's action postulate could be defended as a truly self-evident axiom (i.e. along the lines proposed by Immanuel Kant [*]). Instead of responding further in the comments section of that post, I rather feel that my reply here is long enough to warrant a post of its own.

[Obviously, I encourage you to read my original post and see his full comment before continuing...]

While I wish to address several points simultaneously, I think that it's best to acknowledge Selgin's final point first:

I don't mean to suggest that I would go out on a limb to defend everything that's in my essay (I wrote it as a grad school paper in '82, and like to think that I've learned plenty since).

Of course, and I would not expect him to. That being said, I should think that he still regards the quoted paragraph as an accurate reflection of what Mises believed and what most Miseans continue to assert to this day. Indeed, I could cite a number of near identical quotes by other authors in confirmation of what Selgin wrote. (E.g. Compare the top paragraph of page 7 in Hans-Herman Hoppe's widely cited essay, Economic Science and the Austrian Method.)

That being said, I'm not claiming to be an expert on the praxeological method or the extent to which Mises anticipated the criticisms of his therory. If this wasn't clear enough from my essay, it was precisely for this reason that I have invited rejoinders to my argument from people who are more familiar with Mises than myself. Among other things, I appreciate the pointers to original material where Mises and his followers have tried to address some of specific issues that I highlighted.

However...

I will certainly object to Selgin saying that I missed the part about purposeful behaviour. Indeed, I see the issue of "purpose" as being at the very crux of my argument. Thus, when he writes "praxeology is only concerned with explaining human action to the extent that it is purposeful", I would submit that this simply reinforces the tautological bent that praxeologists are so keen to defend against. Put differently, this is really just an admission to framing economics within the constructs that specifically suit praxeological analysis[**]. This may be a convenient tautology arrangement, but:

1) It then begs the question: Why the need to invoke Kant at all? When you have already specified the terms and limits of your engagement -- i.e. purposeful behaviour -- all this Kantian talk about (non) self-contradicting synthetic a priori truths becomes redundant. I mean, would it really be that different to saying "Homo economicus is only concerned with explaining human behaviour to the extent that agents are rational and narrowly self-interested"? I don't think so.

2) Praxeologists (and Austrians in general) need to be very, very specific about what they regard as non-falsifiable truths and the extent to which it applies to economics in general, or even invalidates other economic theories. While good praxeologists may already have suitably honoured this requirement -- I'm not in a position to say for sure -- I certainly don't think that they've done a very good job of communicating this to the broader economics community, which leads me to...

A final comment: I am rather new to this debate and all this may be old hat for people like George. Indeed, looking back over his comment, I get the strong impression that we may ultimately be saying the same thing; perhaps just coming from different perspectives. However, as per the thrust of my original argument, I would be fine with all this if it weren't for the fact that I keep encountering (so-called) Austrians who emphatically insist that economics requires no empirical validation or arbitration between competing theories.[***]

---

[*] In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued that we can establish known truths, free of the need for any empirical validation. He proposed the existence of so-called synthetic a priori truths, which could not be denied without  some element of self-contradiction. In other words, you require X to attempt a denial of X and thereby, implicitly, admit to its truth.

[**] Not that there is anything wrong with making simplifications and assumptions; any theoretician does this (though some are undoubtedly better than others). However, as long as you admit to doing this, then you necessarily narrow the scope of what you are able to study or "prove" without the aid of good empirical work or further theoretical consideration.

[***] I blame the internets! On a more serious note, I am aware that there is something of Austrian schism between the followers of Hayek and Mises on this issue of epistemology. Indeed, Hayek's "Popperian" stance is one reason why I find him a much more compelling economist that Mises.

Mises's action "axiom" or false dichotomy?

I've been watching the recent libertarian conundrum - concerning the morality of using taxes to prevent a killer asteroid from wiping out humanity - with great fascination. For anyone not privy to the whole saga... Essentially, some (uber) libertarians have made it plain that they would rather die with their principles than see some thievin' gub'mint send up a Bruce Willis-type into space to blow up any asteroid on the back of stolen tax money. [Side note: I was planning to draw some fun parallels to global warming, but John Quiggin beat me to it.]

Lest it be unclear, I am firmly in the camp that proclaims such positions as absurd. Further, it appears that many self-proclaimed libertarians count themselves in the same boat. I'd be worried if they didn't; it would elevate a cut-off-your-nose-to-spite-your-face mentality to an astronomical level, so to speak. Now, there have since been some more nuanced defences along the lines of: "I would contribute; I just don't think you can force other people into contributing." However, from my perspective these positions still overlook the free-rider problem and ultimately equate to little more than a form of culpable homicide. (You can see some of my comments on these issue here.)

All this, however, is just a prelude to what I want discuss here.

Amidst the whole asteroid palaver, I saw an interesting discussion between Daniel Kuehn and Jonathan Catalan. In particular, on why we shouldn't conflate the responses of Austrians with libertarians regarding this matter; even though many Austrians would certainly identify themselves as libertarians, and (I imagine) vice versa. I thought Jonathan's point about these two groups deriving their end-points as the result of distinctly different processes - positive for Austrians vs normative for libertarians - was well made. My interest piqued, I started doing a little internet research to see what else might have been said about the strong link between Austrian economics and libertarianism in spite of their opposing methodologies. Had they been unified through a grand string theory of liberty?

Unfortunately, I got distracted.

And now, finally, we get to the meat of today's post...

A question occurred to me while I was reading a passage by George Selgin, explaining why (many) Austrians hold Ludwig von Mises's praxeological method to be the most valid form of all economic reasoning. Following Immanuel Kant, it basically boils down to a belief that the human action axiom cannot be refuted, because, as per Selgin (pg 22):

To meaningfully deny the "action axiom" (i.e., the claim that people act purposefully) is difficult. Denial of the axiom's empirical validity involves a purposeful act on the part of skeptics. It therefore confronts them with the uncomfortable choice of either conceding the issue or proclaiming that their own disagreement is purposeless. Thus, any denial of the action axiom is self-contradictory.

Am I the only that sees an obvious philosophical objection to this? It extrapolates from a single (contrived?) instance and purports to have shown that the same rules must hold for all human actions over all of time. Near as I can tell, this is done without further justification.

To put things differently, just because I act purposefully at this one particular moment in time (i.e. by denying the action axiom), how does rule out the possibility that I may have acted in a non-purposeful way at any other moment? Indeed, I would think that if someone did try to deny the action axiom, their position would very likely be based on past events and experiences that are completely independent of the present “catch-22” moment. You could easily argue that framing things in such a way – to assume that people act must purposefully at all times, or not at all – is a false dichotomy that invalidates the claim to (strict) apodictic truth.

At best – or worst, depending on your position – it therefore seems to me that denying the action axiom is only momentarily self-contradictory, not an exhaustive set that is valid over all time.[*]

A rather laboured analogy [slightly adapted to make things a bit clearer- Ed.]:

MARIO: "Hey Luigi, are you awake?"
LUIGI: "No."
MARIO: "A-ha! But you have to be awake, since you just answered me. So... Proof that you don't sleep!
LUIGI: "Huh?"
Etcetera.

Anyway, this seems such an obvious objection to me that I can't shake the feeling that a) someone has already proposed it (to possible counter-argument), or b) I'm wrong in an even more obvious way. So, followers of Mises: Hit me with it! 

OTOH, if there is merit to my argument, then I imagine that it opens up the possibility for Austrians, on philosophical and logical grounds, to at least engage in empirical testing of their theories and thus expose them to the scrutiny of falsifiability.

UPDATE: See follow-up here.

Disclaimer: I am in no way disputing the argument that the people generally act with the purposeful intention of improving their situation... i.e. the benefits of voluntary trade, etc. Indeed, I take this to be one of the fundamental pillars of economics and, despite his novel application, Mises was hardly the first to suggest it.(I'm not suggesting that he made this claim.) What I am trying to establish, however, is whether we can truly and with universal certainty describe "human action" as an apodictic axiom, when the key defence rests on a flitting moment of self-contradiction under very specific circumstances.

___

[*] Compare Decartes’s epiphany: “I think therefore I am”. I regard this as a valid synthetic a priori fact (a la Kant), precisely because it concerns only the present moment, i.e. “I am”.

Quote of the day - Experts

An expert is one who knows more and more about less and less.

- Nicholas Butler

Take THAT Adam Smith!

Mild sarcasm font over, there are obviously productivity gains to be had from specialisation and the division of labour. (Busy reading David Landes' "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations" at the moment... and this is certainly a recurring theme.) Still, you start running into diminishing marginal returns if your population is entirely composed of - as an old university professor of mine memorably put it - "idiot savants".

A word from our sponsors...

[Warning: One or two f-bombs in the above clip.]

I have many uninformed opinions and, possibly, some reasonably enlightened ones. If anyone makes it over to this blog -- and that's assuming I ever manage to get some posts going with any kind of regularity -- I promise to try and adhere to the principles espoused by his Dudeness above.

Now, I'll obviously aim to post on things that I feel I can make useful comments about and, more often than not, that will involve a pretty established opinion. But, I'm open to being wrong and I'd enjoy some form of dialectic discourse (in the classic sense, that is).

Unless there are morons involved.

In which case I will be forced to laugh.

In your face.