Empirical evidence and the relevance of ABCT

A new study by Lester and Wolff (2013), hereafter L&W,  is set to cause a bit of a stir in Austrian circles. [HT: Daniel Kuehn]

The paper, which was published in the Review of Austrian Economics no less, finds that Austrian Business Cycle Theory (ABCT ) is not particularly relevant from an empirical standpoint. In short: The unique predictions made by ABCT, concerning the relative price and output changes of goods in different stages of production, are not borne out by the data. It is therefore very difficult to argue that such dynamics are driving the business cycle of the macroeconomy.

I've read through the paper and think that it is a very thorough and technically sound piece of analysis. More importantly, it fills a gap in the literature by using good data to ask the right questions. The conclusion closely matches my own view on ABCT, which is that it constitutes an internally consistent framework for the most part, yet has limited relevance as an overarching macro theory. (That said, L&W also acknowledge that Austrians emphasise a number of concepts, from the coordinating role of market prices and the inter-temporal allocation of resources, that are very valuable to broader economics. Mainstream macro is certainly richer for incorporating these insights.)

Arguing with Austrian-types is something of a side hobby for yours truly and I sent a copy of the paper to Chris Becker, my friend since school days and staunch proponent of all things ABCT. He has written a thoughtful blog post on what he sees are the "flaws and shortcomings" of the study. However, I am not persuaded by his arguments.

Chris starts out by calling into question the various data and metrics used by L&W. For instance, he says that PPI is "only a proxy" for actual economic activity and market prices as "no statistical measure is 100% accurate". Wait a minute, that is simply a tautology. Statistics are by definition imperfect representations of the true state of nature based on probabilistic laws and frequency distributions. To claim that this invalidates their use in scientific research is to a) betray a misunderstanding of how statistics actually works and b) discard a great majority of scientific discoveries and technological advancements since before even the Enlightenment. All that really matters in this case is that these indexes constitute accurate representations of the underlying variables and populations that they refer to. I see no reason to think that they are biased in a manner that systematically renders them uninformative (or misleading) -- particularly if the proposed dynamics were truly the main drivers of large swings in economic activity. I should also say that Chris' objections here would strike me as more convincing if I didn't see Austrians constantly referring to PPI, money supply data, etc. in support of their own arguments.

Next, Chris walks through the various monetary policy variables used in the study and what he perceives as their shortcomings. For the record, L&W use the Federal Funds Rate (FRR) as their main monetary policy variable, while a number of other metrics (M0, M1, M2, etc ) are utilized for robustness checks. In each case, these various monetary policy variables return the same broad set of results that ultimately fail to find vindication for ABCT. (That's the point of running robustness checks after all; they should produce results that are consistent with each other.) Chris does seem to agree with L&W in regarding the FFR as the most appropriate variable to proxy for changes in monetary policy. He even writes: "It is instructive that distortions of the FFR provide the most significant response in favour of ABCT, as it is the divergence between this interest rate and the natural rate of interest that sets in motion the business cycle, according to the Mises-Hayek theory." Except it isn't really instructive at all, because even if some of the coefficients have the same sign as predicted by the theory, they are almost uniformly insignificant from an economic and statistical perspective! L&W are very clear about this and make the point several times throughout their paper. For example (and with emphasis added):

It is critical to note that the results lack statistical significance. In each IRF [Impulse Response Function], the 80 % confidence interval bands suggest that none of the four IRFs demonstrate impact or dynamic responses which differ significantly from zero for more than a few months. This point is particularly relevant when ABCT would otherwise rely on the large shifts in capital to drive business cycle dynamics. 

Once again, we are trying to discern whether ABCT is a plausible candidate for explaining the business cycle at large. According to this evidence, that doesn't appear to be the case.

Chris continues his discussion on monetary policy variables by describing ways in which they may or may not be directly relevant to ABCT, and how the theory can ostensibly accommodate findings that run counter to predictions made by the standard ABCT model. I won't go into too deeply into these issues except to say that I think he runs dangerously close to describing ABCT in pseudoscientific terms. As Popper correctly pointed out many years ago, a theory which claims its strength is to account for any possible outcome is no real scientific theory at all. On the flipside, to say that there are other factors that mitigate how the dynamics of ABCT play out in the economy, is tantamount to admitting that it has limited relevance for explaining observed economic phenomena! (Further, given that the dataset runs from 1972 to 2011 and the empirical analysis tracks variables over a 60-month period following a policy shock, I personally don't think that appealing to "credit injection points" and "historical contingencies" holds much water.)

The post ends with a helpful (ahem) reading list. I have taken the liberty of noting down the respective page numbers for each of the books that Chris recommends: "To really understand ABCT, one should read Ludwig von Mises’ “Human Action” [924 pages] , Friedrich von Hayek’s “Prices and Production” [594 pages], Murray Rothbard’s “Man, Economy, and State” [1,441 pages], and Jesus Huerta de Soto’s “Money, Bank Credit, and Economic Cycles.” [777 pages]". Now, I know that people like to make fun of some Austrians for inevitably referring them to incredibly lengthy treatises during internet debates (often in lieu of making actual arguments). I don't usually think of my friend as falling into that category, but come on... 3,736 pages! If that's what it takes to truly understand ABCT, then I sincerely doubt that anyone has a coherent grip on it.

Allow me to conclude by making two general observations:

1) I may be wrong, but I can't quite escape the feeling that econometrics is seen by many as the preserve of academics and government. That couldn't be further from the truth. Econometrics and statistical analysis has been fundamental to virtually every private company and industry that I have ever worked in, with or am aware of... from the energy sector to finance to consulting to media. If empirical methods were truly misleading, then surely the evolutionary dynamics of the market would have brought about their demise long ago?

2) As with any scientific field or theory, no single study -- no matter how well done -- is enough to invalidate an entire research programme. Similarly, I am hardly claiming that econometrics and empirical studies are infallible. (In addition to discussing the vexing problems of identification many times on this blog, I have also argued that theory and data are mutually reinforcing so that one acts as a check on the other.) However, I do wonder what evidence would be sufficient for Austrians to reconsider their theories. I detect a remarkable tendency to dismiss any empirical evidence that runs counter to ABCT and its related concepts. It should be said that all major schools of economic thought have had to face up to the challenges presented by the data... And are better for it. Keynesians made significant adjustments to their theories in the face of 1970's stagflation, as well as the intellectual challenges of the Lucas Critique and microfoundations movement. For their part, recent events have forced Monetarists to confront the limitations of Friedman's quantity of money supply rule and the potential ineffectiveness of monetary policy at the zero lower bound. Theory cannot advance if it is impervious to data.

___

PS - An ungated version of the L&W paper can be downloaded here.

PPS - Those interested in this subject should also read Daniel's excellent overview of Hayek's version of ABCT, which I believe is forthcoming in Critical Review.

Advocacy and climate research

The latest furore to erupt in the climate blogosphere concerns whether climate scientists undermine their credibility by engaging in advocacy? (For some responses, see James Annan, Gretchen Goldman and HB&H.)

As it happens, I recently wrote a term-paper on this exact issue for my philosophy of science class. I've decided to make it available here for those who are interested in this debate!

To summarise, I don't see anything inherently wrong with scientists engaging in political advocacy, as long as they are explicit in their intentions... and the scope of their expertise. (E.g. I often see physical scientists make strong pronouncements about economic matters and that makes me uncomfortable.) One climate scientist whom I feel always struck a good balance on these issues and quote in my term-paper is the late Stephen Schneider. To channel Schneider: Our response to climate change must be underpinned by scientific facts, but it should ultimately also be reflective of society's value judgements -- including those of our scientists.

Some brief points/caveats:

• This was a “pass/fail” essay, aimed at gaining admission to sit the exam, and I hope that you’ll evaluate the material accordingly. That said, the emphasis on citations and quotations probably means that it provides a good overview of the issues.
• Apart from scientists working on the physical basis for climate change, I also tried to pay special attention to the role of economists. The Stern Review, which many people regard as the archetypal blend of economics and advocacy, therefore comes in for special attention.

Click to read the term-paper.

UPDATE: I've just finished listening to a very interesting discussion between the climate scientists, Gavin Schmidt, Richard Betts and Judith Curry, on this precise topic. I am again struck by something that was very clear to me whilst researching my essay: The various sides all seem to agree on the principles (i.e. being open about one’s area of expertise and clear on your value judgements when advocating for policy). The real sticking point appears to be one of application.

July playlist

My fellow Noondaytune.com contributors have outdone themselves with some very cool song choices during the month of July. I say this with some authority as it was my turn to go through them and select eight favourite tracks for an end-of-the-month playlist. Here it is!

Noonday Tune - Volume 2: Twelve from Noonday Tune on 8tracks Radio.

(In addition to the opening track of the above playlist, my own recent contributions include Nick Cave & The Bad Seeds and Mikhael Paskalev.)

Inflation-targeting, CPI measures and the poor

In a bid to get back to regular blogging, below is a comment that I've just left under a Daily Maverick column by Paul Berkowitz, entitled "Who benefits from inflation-targeting?" It includes the following provocative graph on the relative inflation levels faced by different consumer groups in South Africa.

___

There are a number of legitimate reasons to critique an inflation-targeting regime. Further, the relatively high inflation burden felt by poorer segments of society certainly merits attention in of itself. That said, there are some persistent misconceptions among the public about inflation-targeting: What are its goals and what are the (theoretical) mechanisms by which these are achieved -- particularly w.r.t. a central bank's chosen CPI measure? My gripe with this article is that it may perpetuate such misconceptions by failing to acknowledge an important principle of inflation-targeting.

Rather than simply being an end in of itself, an inflation target is also seen as a means of stabilising the output gap (and ultimately smoothing of the business cycle). Theoretical justification for this so-call "divine coincidence" -- which implies no trade-off between the twin goals of stabilising inflation and maintaining optimal economic output -- is derived from the standard new Keynesian DSGE models favoured by a large segment of macroeconomists. See Blanchard and Gali (2005), or as Blanchard has written elsewhere:

This is a really important result. It implies that central banks should indeed focus just on inflation, and can sleep well at night. If they succeed in stabilizing inflation, they will automatically generate the optimal level of activity. (p. 3)

The upshot is that, if we are going to criticize the representativeness of headline CPI for all income groups, then we should at least acknowledge it's (intended) wider role in stabilising the output gap. (The CPI basket is chosen, after all, because it corresponds to average purchases within the economy as a whole.) You can certainly argue about the conditions under which "the divine coincidence" is satisfied, as well the theoretical underpinnings of the DSGE models. However, closing the output gap is probably very much in the poor's interest as well.

On a final and related note, there are severe drawbacks to the SARB targeting a predominantly commodities-based basket that would more closely accord with the average purchases of low-income families. Most obviously, the SARB is more or less powerless to control the inherent volatility of commodity groups, not to mention the potential for causing very counterproductive amplifications in the consumption cycle. (See here, esp. end of point 4.)

Personal note

I'm not normally one for broadcasting personal information and relationship updates on social media, but, hey, this a big one.

Very pleased, then, to say that I am recently returned from a trip to Veneto, Italy, engaged to the beautiful Miss LB. (Soon to be Mrs LM, although a rose by any other name...)

My five-year charm offensive has obviously paid dividends. 

Finally. 

In other news, Daniel Kuehn was kind enough to remind me on Facebook that I shouldn't make the mistake of thinking that my probation period is now over... Sage advice.

Music updates

My latest contributions to Noondaytune are a mix of classic rock and Nordic lo-fi (complete with a youth choir). Something for everyone!

1) Crosby, Stills, Nash & Young - "Almost Cut My Hair"

2) Mr Little Jeans - "Oh Sailor"

It's not every day that you're called an idiot by Nassim Taleb

Or a "bloggist" for that matter.

Here and here.

To be fair, Taleb has charged that many minds superior to my own are beset by idiocy, so I'm in reasonable company. More seriously, he did at least tone down his bombast when I pointed out that he had misunderstood what I was asking.

The background is this post, where I wondered (quite respectful like!) what Taleb made of the research that shows people have a tendency to overestimate the likelihood of low-probability events if they were framed in highly dramatic terms. This seemed to run counter to a recurring theme in his writings, which is that people are blind to "black swans"... basically that they consistently underestimate low-prob, high impact events.

Taleb pointed me towards a short paper on "binary" (up vs down) versus "vanilla" (+500 vs +5,000,000 vs -5,000,000) outcomes, which was supposed to refute the relevance of such studies. However, I remain rather unconvinced. Consider the key figure in my previous post:

Perceived versus actual fatalities. Adapted from Lichtenstein et al. (1978).

As I wrote back then: What we see here is that people have a clear tendency to overstate -- by an order of several magnitudes -- the relative likelihood of death arising due to "unusual and sensational" causes (tornadoes, floods, etc). The opposite is true for more mundane causes of death like degenerative disease (diabetes, stomach cancer, etc).

Now, I certainly agree with Taleb that it is important to distinguish between between binary and continuous outcomes. Asking whether a stock will go up/down is a much less interesting (and less complex) question to ask than whether it will go up/down by a certain amount. You are clearly not comparing apples with apples if you say that a stock will go up by 5% or 500%. In short, binary and continuous ("vanilla") outcomes are incommensurable in terms of evaluating payoffs.

However, the studies that I linked to are interesting exactly because they are comparing the *same* outcome (i.e. death). It makes no sense to say that death by tornado equals five times death by stroke. They are obviously equivalent. The "payoff" is thus the same because the outcome is the same. Further, I'm not claiming that the insights from these particular studies are fully generalisable to all other low probability, high-impact outcomes (especially those in finance). Yet they do show that underestimation of black swan events is hardly a universal phenomenon either... In fact, people here are shown to rely on heuristics that lead them to a diametrically opposite conclusion! I was ultimately interested in hearing from Taleb whether he thinks these heuristics are efficient or not. I didn't get an answer unfortunately, so I guess we'll have to judge for ourselves.

A final observation is that I disagree with the paper's assertion that "binary is limited to probability". (In other words, that binary outcomes say nothing about the size of a payoff.) This is certainly true in many cases -- again, especially in finance -- but not always. In some instances, binary outcomes imply payoffs directly. The obvious example is the one that we have been discussing in this very post, i.e. death. Indeed, I would think that Taleb probably agrees with me, given that one of his favourite analogies is that of a turkey being fattened up in preparation for Thanksgiving.

What Taleb calls his "classical metaphor". A turkey on his way to becoming dinner. (Source)

With apologies to Monty Python, you might say that the prospect of becoming an ex-turkey implies a very obvious payoff indeed.

UPDATE: Andrei Shleifer agrees.

Happenings

Given the inadvertent success of my previous post, I've decided to take the philosophical route for this next one: My fifteen minutes of quasi-blogosphere fame are almost certainly up and so it's time to resume normal services!

With that in mind, here are some mundane reflections on the last two weeks or so:

1) I wrote what should be my final ever (ever ever) sit down exam at the end of May. The subject was philosophy of science and, despite some frustrations, I enjoyed spending time on something that is outside of my normal field of expertise. I have now effectively completed my coursework requirements for the PhD -- both compulsory and elective credits -- and should be able to concentrate on the research side of things. Basically, I've got two years to finish the remaining two chapters in my dissertation and thus, thankfully, in a pretty good position at the moment.

2) My final article on natural gas and the environment was published at The Energy Collective. Having taken on short- and long-term carbon emissions, followed by demands placed on freshwater resources, this one looked at whether fracking can cause earthquakes? (Short answer: Yes, but you'll hardly notice them.) The issues surrounding natural gas and fracking are obviously very contentious. Important research is ongoing and I certainly don't expect everyone to be fully swayed by my articles and arguments. However, having spent a lot of time researching these matters -- giving primacy to the peer-reviewed scientific literature in the process -- the following paragraph provides an accurate summary of my overall impressions: "The takeaway is consistent with the overarching theme of my series. Yes, there are environmental trade-offs to securing the benefits of fracking and natural gas at large. Placed into the right context, however, these are relatively benign and often much better than the immediate alternative. Economics teaches us that there is no such thing as a free lunch, but fracking looks like a pretty good deal to me."

3) Not everyone was happy with the above article and I was involved in some amusing (not to mention ironic) Twitter spats. I'll summarise one of these for you:

@grant_mcdermott: "Does fracking case earthquakes? (link) Yes, but they're so small that you won't notice them."
@LoveCanal2020: "Whatevs! Shell sponsored that post. You're just a shill!"
@grant_mcdermott: "Ad hominem much? Actually, Shell have nothing to do with the content of my article. By all means though, don't address any facts."
@LoveCanal2020: "Meta-analysis Mumbo-jumbo! LOUD NOISES!"
@grant_mcdermott: "Yes. Science. As opposed to anecdotes, wild accusations and LIBERAL use of CAPITAL LETTERS."
@LoveCanal2020: "Criticize my creative use of capital letters, eh? Typical ad hominem!"
@grant_mcdermott: "Ad hominem?? I criticised your emotional outburst in lieu of actual facts."
@LoveCanal2020: "Still counts as ad hominem. #philosophy101"
@grant_mcdermott: "#philosophy101fail" 

etc

4) I'm spanning the genres for my latest song contributions to www.noondaytune.com: The Meters - "It Ain't No Use" and M83 (feat. Susanne Sundfør) - "Oblivion".

Econ blogosphere comment form

There is no cake-stagnation by Tyler Cowen 

Here. Paul Krugman writes about the virtues of black forest cake versus regular vanilla sponge. While I disagree with Paul on the merits of chocolate chip distribution, I found this to be an enjoyable piece.

Caveat emptor, but do read the whole thing.

PS - Humblane S. Arcadian has written a beguiling book on the bakery practices in pre-industrial Abkhazia. Self-recommending.

____

Comments

Scott Sumner: I thought we had all agreed that if you have not reached your cake eating target, then by definition you are not eating enough cake.

Aziz: In the future, all cakes will be produced using solar-powered 3-D printers.

Greg Ransom: Hayek believed that prices were important because they conveyed information. Note well, cake prices are prices in inter-temporal disequilibrium. Scott writes: "by definition you are not eating enough cake".

Noahpinion. Derpity derp derp. #kthxbye

Unlearning Econ: When you get down to it, Cake Libertarianism is just Cake Marxism without the good bits.

Brad DeLong: Niall Ferguson is the stupidest man alive. Yours, Brad DeLong.

Major Freedom: OMG. LOL. Krugman is such an idiot. He doesn't understand the... [several lengthy paragraphs later] ... human-action axiom.

Lord Keynes: Major Freedom is a risible liar. These figures from Davidson et al. show that Hayek failed in his account to justify a natural cake rising rate. C.f. The arguments of Sraffa (1932).

Major Freedom: LK, why do you hate freedom?

Blue Aurora: Dear Firstname Lastname, have you read Dr Michael Emmett Brady on optimal cake consumption? PS - Did you receive my email?

Bob Murphy: Whaaaat? This is a typical Krugman Kupkake Kontradiction. Look at this recipe from Martha Stewart (link). I'm not saying that the data say I'm right. I'm saying that the data say I'm not wrong in a way that says Krugman is not totally right.

Daniel Kuehn: I'm puzzled by the reference to Wicksillian cake recipes within a Kaleckian framework. This just seems an opportune moment for navel gazing by the Kaldorian's to me.

Steve Keen: What the neoclassical cake theory fails to acknowledge is that Hicks rejected his initial recipe formulation in later life. Minsky taught us that baking is de-baking. Also, I predicted the crisis.

Grant McDermott: It's such a pity to see people neglect the in situ evaluation of cakes. Just ask yourself whether "flour" is the same thing as "a flower"? The answer, I trust, is self-evident.

Are there any four-minute miles in economics?

3:59.4

Roger Bannister's four laps of the Iffley Road Track on 6 May 1954 have been immortalised in the annals of sporting lore and human achievement. By becoming the first man to run a sub-four minute mile, he had broken the "impossible" barrier and so made clear the importance of mind over matter. Athletes from all over the world would soon replicate Bannister's feat now that he had liberated them from their mental shackles...

Except... no. The problem with this romantic narrative is that it has been hopelessly embellished. The idea of a four-minute "barrier" was almost entirely the invention of the media, which fanned the idea to sell papers as runners increasingly closed in on the mark. Wikipedia (indulge me) puts it quite nicely:

The claim that a 4-minute mile was once thought to be impossible by informed observers was and is a widely propagated myth created by sportswriters and debunked by Bannister himself in his memoir, The Four Minute Mile (1955). The reason the myth took hold was that four minutes was a nice round number which was slightly better (1.4 seconds) than the world record for nine years, longer than it probably otherwise would have been because of the effect of World War II in interrupting athletic progress in the combatant countries.

I was reminded of this yesterday, as my Twitter and Facebook feeds were flooded by excitable and angry complaints about the Dollar-Rand exchange rate breaching the symbolic threshold of 1:10.

Source: Bloomberg

Now, to be sure, the Rand is at it's weakest level for several years following a number of social upheavals, government scandals and political infighting, questionable economic policy, and wider trends in emerging markets. (Here, here and here for more context.) I should also say that I am not endorsing a "weak Rand" strategy here in any shape or form. I am, however, interested in the question of whether a 1:10 exchange ratio is significant in of itself.

Put differently, do we have reason to believe that the Rand's rate of depreciation will accelerate further as a result of having passed this threshold? I must confess that I don't see it. That's not to say that further depreciation can't happen, but rather: a) That would be the result of existing economic fundamentals rather than surpassing some magic metric mark, b) A full-blown currency crisis seems very unlikely from my perspective. (If nothing else, the South African Reserve Bank is on record as saying that they will tighten policy in the advent of further weakening, although that remains very open to interpretation.)

Moving beyond the case of the USD-ZAR exchange rate, the notion of thresholds pervades much of economics and finance... Or, at least, it pervades talk about economics and finance. Consider, for example, some of the headlines from recent weeks concerning the fall of gold prices to below $1,500 and then $1,400 per ounce... or the brouhaha surrounding that Rogoff-Reinhart paper and their fabled elusive "90 percent" cut-off rate for debt-to-GDP ratios and its supposedly dire consequences on economic growth.

Some of this -- let's call it -- threshold affinity in economics and finance could be justified by underlying factors, such as physical laws, regulatory limits, etc. However, most of it is probably just good copy for selling financial news. At worst, it may even be self-referential nonsense designed to confuse lay investors and the general public. Here are two stylised explanations for why "round number" thresholds shouldn't matter in of themselves:

1. Valuations should ultimately be set according to economic fundamentals. These would not be much different for a stock or trade that is valued at, say, R9.90 versus R10.10.
2. An alternative reason is that traders don't target levels per se. Rather, they target the levels implied by momentum and trend lines (with predefined margins of safety), or algorithmic strategies (which are similar in principle). There's no a priori reason to think that these implied levels will accord to nice round numbers.

Having said that, market psychology can obviously work very differently to the cool, rational calculations implied by standard theory. "Round numbers" will become important, as long as enough people believe them to be important. More precisely, symbolic levels will gain significance if I believe that other people regard them as being significant. (Ye old beauty contest story.) It should also be said that even standard theory does not suppose that change should evolve in a linear fashion...

Let me end this post by saying that I haven't bothered with any kind of literature research; I'd be interested in hearing about studies investigating this type of phenomena. Alternatively, if not much has been done and someone is interested in looking at it further... drop me a line. Two possibilities for checking the existence of "four-minute mile" numbers is that they should act as focal points or thresholds. For the former, we would expect data to bunch around particular levels from both above and below. For the latter, we would expect a discontinuity in the rate of change for a particular stock or currency valuation (i.e. once a threshold is breached). Several ways of testing this empirically immediately spring to mind.